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Abstract 
It is somewhat ironic that Czech eurosceptics managed to delay the ratification 
process of the Lisbon Treaty at a time when they seem to be in decline as a 
political force. President Klaus and his allies are becoming increasingly isolated 
within Czech political circles and lack the support of any established political 
party other than the Communists. The twin pressures of domestic vote 
utilisation and socialisation at the EU level are making Czech eurorealists within 
the Civic Democratic Party less eurosceptic. It is still too early to speak of any 
complete change within the party, however, and any evidence of a re-
orientation of the party’s EU policy remains ambiguous.   
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UNDERSTANDING KLAUS 
THE STORY OF CZECH EUROREALISM  
EPIN WORKING PAPER NO. 26 / NOVEMBER 2009 
MATS BRAUN 
Introduction 
The spotlight fell on the Czech Republic recently as the last remaining hurdle to a successful 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Interestingly, if we look at the views of its population, the 
Czech Republic is not a particularly eurosceptic country. What is specific about the Czech 
Republic, however, is its political elite. The major right-wing party in the country, the Civic 
Democratic Party (ODS), is frequently described in scholarly literature as being soft-
eurosceptic
1 and President Václav Klaus has become one of the toughest opponents of the 
Lisbon Treaty. The author attempts to provide answers to two different questions in this paper. 
Firstly, how should one understand Czech euroscepticism and, in relation to this, what kind of 
Europe do Czech critics of the EU actually want? Secondly, the author turns to the question of 
where Czech eurosceptics are heading now. The claim is made that the Czech political elite is 
gradually being socialised into the EU project and that we are in fact witnessing a slow 
dissolution of Czech euroscepticism. Thus, the recent turmoil over the Lisbon Treaty should be 
understood as having been caused by a small faction of the Czech political elite, led by Václav 
Klaus, which is finding itself increasingly isolated. 
This Working Paper has the following structure: firstly, the background to Czech 
euroscepticism is presented, focusing on the Civic Democratic Party. Secondly, the author 
discusses the Czech domestic battle over the Lisbon Treaty, focusing in particular on the hard 
core of critics, notably President Václav Klaus and his allies, and thirdly an analysis of recent 
developments in the Czech Republic is presented.  
Czech eurorealism 
Czech euroscepticism is non-populist in nature and therefore also different from what is 
commonly seen in most other EU member states. In the Czech Republic euroscepticism is more 
widespread among the political elite than among the wider public. According to Eurobarometer 
polls, the Czech population belongs to the EU mainstream in terms of their support for the 
Union. For instance, when answering the question about whether EU membership is considered 
a ‘good thing’, the country is only slightly below average.
2 What is particular to the Czech 
Republic is the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). The ODS is the main right-wing party and is 
commonly described in the literature as being soft-eurosceptic. In contrast to, for instance, the 
British Tories, the ODS cannot expect to win many votes by criticising the EU; in fact, their 
                                                      
1 See S. Hanley (2008), “Embracing Europe, Opposing EU-rope? Party-based Euroscepticism in the 
Czech Republic”, in A. Szczerbiak and P. Taggart (eds), Case Studies and Country Surveys: Opposing 
Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 243-
262. 
2  Eurobarometer 69 (2008). Národní Zpráva Česká Republika [National Report Czech Republic]. 
Available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb69/eb69_cz_nat.pdf [accessed: 17 July 
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voters are more pro-European than the Czech electorate at large.
3 Thus, their euroscepticism 
cannot be explained as a means of vote utilisation.  
Therefore, the party’s euroscepticism can be described as being more ideological than populist, 
and in order to understand the origins of the party’s view on the EU, it is necessary to look at 
the internal party discourse on the EU. The party coined the term ‘eurorealism’ for their position 
on the EU prior to membership, which, however, they did not challenge. The eurorealism of the 
ODS can be described as a view of the EU in which the big powers dominate and strive for the 
fulfilment of their own interests, and in which small/middle-sized states gain most if they 
protect their own sovereignty and reject the further transfer of power to the EU level. The party, 
therefore, is sceptical of the increased influence of the EU institutions, which are thought to be 
too easily controlled by the big states.
4  
The eurorealist position of the ODS has largely been shaped by the party’s founder, former 
Prime Minister and current President, Václav Klaus. Klaus, who founded the party after 
separation from the Citizens’ Forum in 1991, left the party in autumn 2008. Despite this, his 
influence is still felt in the party’s position on the EU and was one key factor in explaining why 
a majority of ODS delegates voted against the Lisbon Treaty in Parliament in February 2009. 
Any short review of the development of the party’s view on the EU reveals that Klaus’ opinion 
was always more critical of the EU than the official party position.  
In its early days the ODS did not differ much in its views on EU issues from other Czech 
political parties. The desire to join the European institutions was, at the time, one shared by all 
the parties, with the possible exception of the Communist Party. It is even doubtful whether EU 
membership was viewed as being significantly different from, for example, membership of the 
Council of Europe, an organisation that the Czech Republic (Czechoslovakia) joined in 1991. 
However, if we look at Mr. Klaus’ own speeches and articles from the early 1990s, he himself 
expressed a more critical view of the EU than the official party documents. He repeatedly 
described European integration as a dilemma of “how to be European without dissolving like a 
lump of sugar in a cup of coffee”.
5 
The party turned more eurosceptic in 1997-98 after a party and a government crisis caused by 
ambiguous party spending. The crisis had two consequences that prompted a change in the 
party’s EU policies. Firstly, as a consequence of the turbulence within the party, many of Klaus’ 
more pro-European rivals within the party simply left. Secondly, the crisis meant that the party 
was forced into opposition, where it remained until 2006. It was after the crisis that the party 
started presenting its views on Europe as eurorealistic. To a large extent the eurorealism of the 
ODS resembled that of the opposition parties in other post-communist countries, such as 
Hungary and Poland. In all three of these countries, a frequent criticism was that their 
governments did too little to defend national interests during membership negotiations. 
However, the ODS went one step further by articulating their eurorealism more coherently, for 
instance, in the Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism of 2001.
6 
                                                      
3 Ibid. 
4 The ODS thus reached a conclusion on this issue that opposes that of most academic literature focusing 
on small states. See B. Thorhallsson and B Wivel (2006), “Small States in the European Union: What Do 
We Know and What Would We Like to Know?”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 19(4), p. 
655. 
5 V. Klaus (1994) “Česká cesta” [the Czech Road], Praha: Profile, p. 136. 
6 Jan Zahradil, Petr Plecitý, Petr Adrián and Miloslav Bednář (2001), “Manifest českého eurorealismu 
(dokument k  ideové konferenci ODS)” (available at http://www.ods.cz/docs/dokumenty/zahradil-
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Consequently, the party had an ambivalent position on EU membership even before this became 
a reality in 2004. It was ambivalent in the sense that the party criticised large parts of the 
integration project but did not, in most cases, question the necessity of membership. The 
membership as such could not be challenged, while hardly anyone questioned the economic 
benefits of EU accession. Simultaneously, however, in the party discourse the nation state is 
considered to be the natural unit, and therefore all attempts to restrict sovereignty are considered 
unnatural. The party was thus faced with a dilemma: how far could restrictions of national 
sovereignty be compensated for by economic benefits?
7 
As stated, euroscepticism in the Czech Republic is largely a phenomenon confined to the Civic 
Democratic Party. However, the Communist Party has also provided the country with a 
eurosceptic left, and that party was the only one that encouraged its voters to reject EU 
membership in the referendum of 2003. The Communist Party is anyway considered to be an 
anti-system party which, despite the fact that it usually wins approximately 10% of the votes, is 
marginalised within the Czech political spectrum. There have also been other smaller political 
subjects and one-man parties that have been represented in the European Parliament. But these 
were formed and gained votes primarily thanks to their charismatic leaders (i.e. Jana 
Bobošíková and Vladimír Železný).  
How then can we explain the persistence of euroscepticism in the Czech Republic and in the 
ODS? To some degree the persistence of this scepticism and the reasons why the country held 
up the Lisbon Treaty can be explained by the particular nature of the ODS party discourse on 
the EU. The eurosceptic approach has become a dogma within the party that is difficult to 
change, even if the leadership would like to do so (see below). The second question, which is 
harder to answer, is why this articulation of Europe has been so successful in the Czech 
Republic. As in all candidate countries, EU membership was largely viewed as an 
unquestionable necessity before the country actually joined. Therefore, quite naturally, a 
reaction was expected. However, whereas this was the case in the Czech Republic and Poland, 
for instance, Slovakia and Hungary both had less euroscepticism among their political elite and 
both also ratified the Lisbon Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty rapidly.  
Following the argumentation of Czech EU critics, we can interpret at least two crucial drivers 
behind Czech euroscepticism. First of all, the Czech political elite had great confidence in their 
own transformation process in the 1990s, manifested by their disregard for the Visegrád 
Cooperation and their frustration over the unnecessarily long accession period. Second, they 
viewed the Czech Republic as a historically natural part of the more prosperous ‘West 
European’ region, not only because during the interwar period Czechoslovakia was the only 
lasting democracy in Central Europe, but also because of its relative wealth during this period. 
The Czechs themselves therefore perceived their state as being relatively strong compared to the 
other new post-communist member states and in a relational sense vis-à-vis the old member 
states, so some parts of the elite found it hard to accept the asymmetrical relationship between 
the EU and the candidate states. The negative experiences of the accession period are still the 
main reason for the persistence of Czech euroscepticism.
8 
                                                      
7 For a detailed discussion, see M. Braun, “Talking Europe: the Dilemma of Sovereignty and 
Modernization”, Cooperation and Conflict, 43(4), pp. 397–420. 
8 See M. Braun (2008), Modernisation Unchallenged: The Czech Discourse on European Unity, Institute 
of International Relations, Prague. 4 | MATS BRAUN 
 
The Civic Democrats and the Lisbon Treaty 
ODS voters are, according to opinion polls, more positive about the Lisbon Treaty than the 
average Czech voter.
9 The ODS leadership also advocated the ratification of the Treaty, 
primarily for two reasons. The first is that between 2007 and 2009, the ODS was in a coalition 
government with two smaller, pro-European parties (the Christian Democrats and the Greens). 
Thus, a rejection of the Treaty could have endangered the survival of the Mirek Topolánek 
cabinet. Second, it was believed that a non-ratification of the Treaty could have had negative 
consequences for the upcoming Czech EU presidency in 2009. For all these reasons it is 
surprising that part of the ODS party put up a fight over the Treaty and also managed to 
severely delay the ratification process. 
The Lisbon Treaty (LT) was approved in both chambers of the Czech Parliament during spring 
2009, and thereafter only a very small part of the political elite, led by Mr. Klaus and a few 
senators loyal to him, continued in their attempts to delay the completion of the Czech 
ratification process. They, however, claimed to respect the original ODS position on the Treaty, 
which since the Convention on the Future of Europe consisted of a resistance to revise the 
Treaty. During the Convention the Civic Democrats criticised the inclusion of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in the Treaty and the increased powers of the European Parliament and 
favoured what they called a “Europe of Democracies” – basically a more intergovernmental 
form of cooperation.
10  
After the Convention and the Intergovernmental Conference of 2003, the ODS profiled itself as 
a strong opponent of the Treaty.
11 The party’s resistance to the Constitutional Treaty (TCE) was 
ideological and since many ODS members argue that the TCE and the LT are virtually the 
same, the same criticism is being applied to the LT. The resolution of the party congress in 2006 
is illustrative of the party’s position. It prohibited politicians from the party from accepting any 
new transfer of powers to the EU or extending the qualified majority voting in the Council to 
more issues.
12  
President Klaus and his allies 
Mr. Klaus is sometimes described as unpredictable. This is not only his media persona outside 
the Czech Republic but increasingly also in domestic print. Why Klaus acts in the way he does 
is a frequently asked question. There have recently been speculations about Klaus’ connections 
with Russia, for instance, since only Russia would stand to benefit from the non-ratification of 
the Lisbon Treaty. Among other reasons, a non-ratification would hamper progress towards a 
common EU energy policy, so following this line of thought, Klaus is pro-Russian and therefore 
a trouble-maker in the EU.
13 Rather than attempt to explain the true motives of President Klaus, 
which in any case is not possible, an account of Klaus’ view of the EU and the Lisbon Treaty 
                                                      
9 STEM Surveys (2008). Informace z výzkumů STEM trendy 10/2008 [Information from STEM surveys 
– trends]. Available at http://www.stem.cz/clanek/1635 [accessed: 17 July 2009]. 
10 P. Kratochvíl and L. Königová (2005), “Jak utváret Evropu: konvencne nebo konventne? Konvent jako 
alternativní metoda prípravy základních smluv evropské integrace” [How to shape Europe: 
Conventionally or by the Convention? The Convention as an alternative method of preparing basic 
treaties of European integration], Mezinárodní vztahy, 2/2005, pp. 24-41. 
11 ODS (2004). STEJNÉ ŠANCE PRO VŠECHNY: program pro volby do Evropského parlamentu [Equal 
Opportunities for All, a Manifesto for the Elections to the European Parliament]. Available at 
http://www.ods.cz/volby/programy/2004e.php [accessed 7 July 2009].  
12 ODS (2006), “Usnesení 17. kongresu ODS” [Resolution of the 17th ODS Congress], available at 
http://www.ods.cz/akce/kongresy/17.kongres/stranka.php?page=450) (1 October 2008). 
13 See, Respekt Vol. 15, 2009. UNDERSTANDING KLAUS | 5 
 
will be presented here, a view that in itself is rather coherent but far from the mainstream one, 
either within the EU at large or within the Czech Republic.  
To this end it is helpful to look at the first request of a group of senators put to the 
Constitutional Court in this matter from spring 2008. It should be noted that these senators, most 
of them members of the ODS, are closely linked to Klaus and therefore the points raised also 
reflect Klaus’ concerns. In this request the senators posed six specific questions regarding the 
Treaty.
14 These points are also the ones most frequently used by Klaus and his followers in their 
criticism of the Treaty. The first question referred to the division of competences, the second to 
the flexibility clause, the third to the so-called passerelle clause, the fourth to the possibility of 
the EU being a subject of international agreements, the fifth to the increased competences of the 
EU within the former third pillar and the sixth to the status of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.
15 
President Klaus argued in the hearing at the Constitutional Court regarding the LT that the main 
problem of the compatibility between the LT and the Czech Constitution is that the Treaty 
would give the EU the overall say over competences through the flexibility clause and the 
‘passerelle’ clause. These clauses enable the competences of the EU to extend into new areas 
and to change the decision-making in selected areas from unanimity to a qualified majority after 
a unanimous decision in the Council. Klaus argues that “there cannot be the possibility that the 
EU institutions could interpret the range of transfer of competences on their own, or even 
transfer competences from our country, even if we would agree or not agree to this.”
16 Since the 
Czech government is present in the Council, Klaus’ point is only intelligible if the “we” in the 
above sentence is understood to mean the Czech Parliament. The fact that the Treaty enables 
some changes of competences if the Council so decides unanimously means that the Czech 
Parliament has lost the ‘competence of competences’, which is unacceptable to Klaus. Therefore 
the President’s position should not be understood as being that of an intergovernmentalist; what 
he favours might be called an inter-parliamentary model of integration.  
To Klaus, the European Parliament could never provide a basis for the democratic legitimacy of 
the EU, since in his view democracy is by definition linked to the nation state. He argues that a 
liberal democracy cannot function without “... a citizenship principle based on the natural 
loyalty of people towards their own nation and with an elementary feeling of national 
identity”.
17 
Following on from this, Klaus has repeatedly stated that European cooperation should be based 
on intergovernmental cooperation, where no state can be overruled by others.
18 Thus, he 
actually rejects any form of qualified majority voting (QMV) or simple majority voting in the 
Council. It is therefore hard to imagine what kind of a deal would satisfy this group of Czech 
Lisbon Treaty critics. Klaus’ views on Europe are currently too far from the mainstream 
position in the Czech Republic and in the EU to make any completely satisfactory deal possible. 
                                                      
14 The court verdict stated that these points do not contradict the Czech Constitution.  
15 Senát (2008), “Žádost o posouzení souladu Lisabonské smlouvy s ústavním pořádkem  ČR Senát 
Parlamentu České republiky podává” [Request for examination of the compatibility of the Lisbon Treaty 
and the Constitutional Order of the Czech Republic, required by the Senate of the Czech Republic]. 
16 V. Klaus (2008), “Vystoupení prezidenta republiky na jednání Ústavního soudu o Lisabonské smlouvě” 
[The Speech of the President during the negotiations of the Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty], 
available at http://www.klaus.cz/klaus2/asp/clanek.asp?id=KO4l54HvOCa4.  
17 V. Klaus (2005a), “Využijme ‘období reflexe’ pro vymezení jiné Evropské unie”, Lidové noviny, 16 
July. 
18 V. Klaus (2007) “Před debatou o euroústavě” [On the upcoming debate on the Constitutional Treaty], 
Hospodářské noviny, 13 June.  6 | MATS BRAUN 
 
From this perspective Klaus’ proposal to include two sentences in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights assuring the legality of the Beneš decrees should be seen as merely a tactical move. The 
reason why Klaus dislikes the LT is not due to any real fear of Sudeten German property claims, 
but his general disagreement with the direction of the European integration process.  
However, the main reason why Klaus eventually put his signature to the Treaty is likely to be 
that he is aware of the limitations of his office. It is not in his competences as President of the 
Republic to veto this kind of international treaty, which has already been accepted by a qualified 
majority in both chambers of the Czech Parliament. Klaus therefore came in for criticism for not 
respecting the Czech constitution from Czech MPs, journalists and legal experts. However, the 
government took a more reticent position since the quickest way to secure Czech ratification of 
the Treaty was to seek agreement with the president. In the end this strategy also proved to be 
an effective one. Since at the end of October 2009 the European Council agreed to the Czech 
opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights and at the beginning of November the Czech 
Constitutional Court confirmed the LT’s compatibility with the Czech constitution, Klaus could 
no longer refrain from finalising the Czech ratification process. If he would have tried to do so, 
he would most certainly have faced a constitutional complaint for failing to fulfil his 
constitutional duties.
19  
The socialisation of the Czech political elite 
Even if the leadership of the ODS reoriented their policies primarily as a consequence of 
strategic concerns relating to the presidency and the coalition government, there is some 
indication that we are witnessing a real change in the EU policies of the ODS. It is likely that 
this is related to the increased interaction of leading politicians with their European counterparts 
in the period leading up to the Czech EU Presidency, and is thus a consequence of socialisation. 
The socialisation hypothesis suggests that the collective norms that operate in the EU gradually 
affect and change the identity of the participants.
20 Some evidence of a change of preferences is 
offered by former Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek, who invested much of his political capital 
in the ratification of the Treaty in the Czech Republic even after he left office.  
Topolánek also brought some politicians with a more pragmatic view of the EU into high 
politics during his period as prime minister, such as former Deputy Prime Minister Alexandr 
Vondra. Other leading ODS politicians changed the discourse about the EU, such as the former 
Minister of Interior Ivan Langer. Langer was one of the very few high-ranking ODS politicians 
who rejected Czech membership of the EU prior to accession.  
Yet, we cannot speak of a complete change in EU rhetoric of the ODS, and even Topolánek 
continuously criticises parts of the treaty. The ODS leadership is in the difficult position of also 
trying to satisfy the eurosceptic elements of the party. There is a split within the party over, 
among other issues, the EU policy that culminated when Klaus resigned from his post as 
honorary chairman and left the party in 2008.  
If we look at the larger political elite, a whole range of eurosceptic subjects competed for seats 
in the elections to the European Parliament. However, none of these groupings was successful. 
Only Jana Bobošíková and her party Suverenita (sovereignty) made a rather good election and 
managed to gain 4.3%, which is close to the Czech threshold of 5%. But her success came 
                                                      
19 See J. Kudrna (2009), “Ať Klaus zváží odchod” [Klaus should consider resignation], MF Dnes, 15 
October. 
20 J.T. Checkel (2007), “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework”, in J.T. Checkel (ed.), International Institutions and Socializing in Europe, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-30. UNDERSTANDING KLAUS | 7 
 
primarily by her appealing to anti-German sentiment among a certain sector of the population. 
Thus, the outcome of these elections seems to confirm that in general, Czech voters are not very 
eurosceptical, particularly not the right-wing voters.  
However, there are three arguments contesting the view of a successful socialisation of the 
Czech political elite. Firstly, despite the pro-European views of ODS voters, and the pro-Lisbon 
Treaty approach of the ODS leadership, a majority of the ODS MPs and senators actually voted 
against the Treaty. Secondly, the ODS formed the European Conservative and Reform Group in 
the European Parliament, together with the British Conservatives and the Polish Law and 
Justice Party. Clearly, there is a possibility that this group can help conserve the eurosceptic 
approach of the ODS. The collaboration with the British Conservatives, in a way, gives 
legitimacy to the reluctant approach of the ODS while showing that their opinions are shared by 
a well-established West European party. Thirdly, and related to the second point, the ODS 
leader for the elections to the EP was Jan Zahradil. Zahradil, who is also deputy chairman of the 
newly formed party group, is, together with Klaus, one of the two main architects of ODS 
eurorealism. Even if he has lately expressed a more pragmatic view on the ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty, there are few indications that he has actually changed his general opinions on the 
EU.  
However, despite the fact that the development is not one-sided, which confirms the fulfilment 
of the socialisation thesis concerning the Czech political elite, it is likely that the hard core of 
Czech eurosceptics is becoming more and more isolated. The combination of socialisation on 
the EU level and vote utilisation is likely to limit the scope of right-wing Czech euroscepticism. 
The ODS internal party discourse is sticky however, and it remains to be seen to what degree an 
actual change of the party is possible and how quickly this change can take place.  
Conclusion 
The obstacles that surrounded the Czech ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty should not be 
understood as a proof of the strength of Czech euroscepticism. In fact the opposite is true. The 
socialisation process of the Czech political body would seem to be rather successful. The 
political elite are becoming more pro-European, partly as a result of the increased interaction 
with their European counterparts and EU officials, not least during the preparations for and the 
organisation of the Czech Council Presidency. The problems of ratifying the LT in the country 
should be seen as an attempt by an ever-shrinking part of the elite who resist socialisation to 
make a final imprint on the future of Europe. 
Crucial for the future development of Czech euroscepticism, however, are developments within 
the ODS. President Klaus is not likely to change his position on the EU. Even if Klaus is no 
longer a member of the party, what is important for future developments is if his followers 
within the party strengthen their position ahead of the spring 2010 elections. There is a faction 
of the ODS party that is hard-line eurosceptic. The party discourse on the EU since the mid-90s 
has constructed a dogmatic view of the EU that has seemed to stick. Any attempts at greater 
reform of the party’s EU policy are met by protests from this segment of the party. However, 
due to the double pressures of domestic vote utilisation and socialisation on the EU level, the 
influence of this group is likely to decrease.   
Nothing suggests that the ODS will reconsider its commitment to the newly formed European 
Conservative and Reform Group in the European Parliament in the near future, but even if the 
party remains critical in its rhetoric of several crucial aspects of the current EU, there will be 
fewer concrete consequences of this.  
The struggle over the LT was probably the last great opportunity for a dying breed Czech 
eurosceptics to make their voices heard. In the end it was only a very small part of the political 8 | MATS BRAUN 
 
elite that tried to block the ratification process. Consequently, Klaus had no other choice but to 
put his signature to the Treaty after the Czech Constitutional Court had clearly stated the 
Treaty’s compatibility with the Czech Constitution. The President, however, managed to 
achieve a Czech op-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights, despite the fact that by doing 
so he clearly exceeded the mandate of his office. It remains to be seen if there will be a future 
Czech debate on the domestic legitimacy of this opt-out. About EPIN 
EPIN is a network of European think tanks and policy institutes with members in almost every 
member state and candidate country of the European Union. It was established in 2002 during the 
constitutional Convention on the Future of Europe. Then, its principal role was to follow the 
works of the Convention. More than 30 conferences in member states and candidate countries 
were organised in the following year.  
With the conclusion of the Convention, CEPS and other participating institutes decided to keep 
the network in operation. EPIN has continued to follow the constitutional process in all its phases: 
(1) the intergovernmental conference of 2003-2004; (2) the ratification process of the 
Constitutional Treaty; (3) the period of reflection; and (4) the intergovernmental conference of 
2007. Currently, EPIN follows (5) the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty and – should the 
treaty enter into force – (6) the implementation of the Treaty. 
Since 2005, an EPIN Steering Committee takes the most important decisions. Currently there are 
six member institutes: CEPS, DIIS (Denmark), ELCANO (Spain), HIIA (Hungary), Notre Europe 
(France) and SIEPS (Sweden). 
Status quo 
Currently there are 30 EPIN members from 26 countries, also from countries outside of the EU. 
The 'hard core' work of the network is based on the cooperation of about 10 most active institutes. 
The member institutes are quite diverse in size and structure, but are all characterised by political 
independence and the absence of any predetermined point of view or political affiliation. 
EPIN organises two major conferences in Brussels per year; as well as ad hoc conferences or 
other activities in member states. The network publishes Working Paper Series and other papers, 
which primarily focus on institutional reform of the Union. The network follows preparations for 
the European elections, the EU’s communication policy, and the political dynamics after 
enlargement, as well as EU foreign policy and justice and home affairs. 
Achievements 
EPIN is a network that offers its member institutes the opportunity to contribute to the 'European 
added-value' for researchers, decision-makers and citizens. The network provides a unique 
platform for researchers and policy analysts to establish personal links, exchange knowledge and 
collaborate on EU-related issues. Members bring their national perspectives to bear on the issues 
tackled and through collaboration they contribute to establish a 'European added-value' (e.g. on 
EU communication, flexible integration). By doing so they strengthen a common European 
dimension in the national debates on Europe. 
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